Responding to the increasingly influential role of Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy in recent years, *Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Total Domination: The Holocaust, Plurality, and Resistance*, critically engages with Arendt’s understanding of totalitarianism. According to Arendt, the main goal of totalitarianism was total domination; namely, the virtual eradication of human legality, morality, individuality, and plurality. This attempt, in her view, was most fully realized in the concentration camps, which served as the major “laboratories” for the regime. While Arendt focused on the perpetrators’ logic and drive, Michal Aharony examines the perspectives and experiences of the victims and their ability to resist such an experiment.

The first book-length study to juxtapose Arendt’s concept of total domination with actual testimonies of Holocaust survivors, this book calls for methodological pluralism and the integration of the voices and narratives of the actors in the construction of political concepts and theoretical systems. To achieve this, Aharony engages with both well-known and non-canonical intellectuals and writers who survived the Auschwitz and Buchenwald concentration camps. Additionally, she analyzes the oral testimonies of survivors who are largely unknown, drawing from interviews conducted in Israel and in the U.S., as well as from videotaped interviews from archives around the world.

Revealing various manifestations of unarmed resistance in the camps, this study demonstrates the persistence of morality and free agency even under the most extreme and de-humanizing conditions, while cautiously suggesting that absolute domination is never as absolute as it claims or wishes to be. Scholars of political philosophy, political science, history, and Holocaust studies will find this an original and compelling book.

**Michal Aharony** is currently teaching in Beit-Berl College, Israel. She was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hebrew University, the International Institute for Holocaust Research at Yad Vashem, and the Open University, Israel. Her research interests include history of political ideas in modern political thought and Holocaust studies.
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For my parents
By its very nature, when it comes to describing reality, art always demands a certain intensification, for many and various reasons. However, that is not the case with the Holocaust. Everything in it already seems so thoroughly unreal, as if it no longer belongs to the experience of our generation, but to mythology. Thence comes the need to bring it down to the human realm. This is not a mechanical problem, but an essential one. When I say, “to bring it down,” I do not mean to simplify, to attenuate, or to sweeten the horror, but to attempt to make the events speak through the individual and in his language, to rescue the suffering from huge numbers, from dreadful anonymity, and to restore the person’s given and family name, to give the tortured person back his human form, which was snatched away from him.

Aharon Appelfeld, “After the Holocaust”
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Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the instruction and assistance that teachers, colleagues, and friends provided me during the course of my research and writing. I would first like to thank Natalja Mortensen, my editor at Routledge, for her belief in this project and for her assistance throughout its publication process. My greatest debt is owed to my teacher and dissertation advisor James Miller at the New School for Social Research, who supervised the research from which this project developed. His generous guidance, encouragement, and enduring support, as well as his breadth of knowledge, patience, and critical attention to my work, made this book possible. I am also extremely grateful to Richard J. Bernstein, Agnes Heller, and Andreas Kalyvas, my committee members, for supporting this project, for generously sharing their expertise, and for their invaluable counsel. I owe special thanks as well to Ishay Landa at the Open University of Israel, who guided me in the later stages of my writing as a postdoctoral fellow there. His close reading of draft chapters of the manuscript, detailed commentaries, insightful suggestions and encouragement were vital.

I remain much obliged to many scholars, colleagues, and friends who read and discussed book chapters and presentations with me and helped to shape this project. I would first like to thank my friend Roy Ben Shai for his beneficial comments and assistance in crystallizing many of the conclusions of this study. I benefited from many inspiring and challenging conversations with Roy, whose advice and, when needed, incisive and constructive criticism, were invaluable. I am also most grateful to Martin Shuster for reading the entire manuscript and for his perceptive comments and encouragement. I wish to express my gratitude as well to Jerome Kohn, Devin Pendas, Julia Schulze Wessel, and Joseph White for reading portions of this work and for their insightful comments. I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript and of an earlier article for offering many helpful suggestions. Special thanks are due my good friend Keren Stein for reading draft chapters of this book, for her critical commentary, and for her boundless support. My gratitude as well to Daniel Kushner, for reading various parts of the manuscript and for his thoughtful suggestions. I am grateful to Steven Aschheim, Ferzina Banaji, Karen Coleman, Ariel Glucklich, Gideon Greif,
Acknowledgments

Gila Haimovic, Tomaz Jardim, David Plotke, Nancy Shealy, and Na’ama Shik for their kind assistance.

I am thankful for the institutional and financial support I received during the time I spent researching and writing. The New School for Social Research University and Dissertation Fellowships supported the initial stages of writing my dissertation. This book was made possible in part by funds granted me through a 2007–2008 Lerman Center for the Study of Jewish Resistance Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The Center’s fellows, staff, and visiting academics offered me the most stimulating environment for research and writing. Receipt of the Corrie ten Boom Research Award at the Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education, the University of Southern California, allowed me further archival research. I would like to thank the Franz Rosenzweig Minerva Research Center for German-Jewish Literature and Cultural History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for granting me a Postdoctoral Visiting Research Fellowship in 2010. My gratitude as well to the International Institute for Holocaust Research, Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority in Jerusalem for a 2010–2011 Postdoctoral Research Fellowship. Finally, I thank the Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies at the Open University of Israel for granting me a Postdoctoral Fellowship during 2011–2013.


I owe particular thanks to my good friend Jennifer Hansen-Glucklich who was a constant source of emotional support. Her assistance and much-needed encouragement at various junctures of this project were invaluable. My sincere thanks as well go to my good friends Nirit Ben-Ari and Hadas Cohen for their endless emotional support. In spite of the generous assistance received from so many individuals and institutions, however, the statements made and the ideas expressed in this book are solely my responsibility. Finally, my deepest thanks to Abraham Ahuvia, Fanny Aizenberg, Yehudit (Itka) Alter, Lillian Bekefi, Dario Gabai, Agi Geva, Dita Kraus,
Aharon Alfred (Onny) Ohnhaus, Jacob Lois Tsur, Judy Cohen, Azriel (Pize) Zimche, and Hilde Zimche for agreeing to sit for interviews and for sharing their memories and thoughts with me.

I am profoundly grateful to my parents Yossi and Rachel for their continuous support and encouragement, and it is to them that I dedicate this book, in boundless appreciation. I am also grateful to my brother Tal and to my beloved son Nadav, who was born in the very last stages of writing and revising. His birth gave new meaning to the completion of this project. Last but not least, I wish to thank my partner and closest friend, Uri, whose love and infinite patience made this book possible.
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Introduction

The real story of the Nazi-constructed hell is desperately needed for the future. Not only because these facts have changed and poisoned the very air we breathe, not only because they now inhabit our dreams at night and permeate our thoughts during the day—but also because they have become the basic experience and the basic misery of our time. Only from this foundation, on which a new knowledge of man will rest, can our new insights, our new memories, our new deeds, take their point of departure.¹

Hannah Arendt

This epigraph, words that Hannah Arendt wrote in a book review as early as 1946,² encapsulates the motivation for and the purpose of this study. Arendt was profoundly influenced by the emergence of Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s; it had a direct impact on her life and consequently on her political thought, from her first book until her final days. A victim of Nazism herself, Arendt was a German-Jewish refugee who was forced to escape her homeland and, for eighteen years, was stateless.³ In totalitarianism, a regime whose essence is terror and whose outcome is a most radical negation of freedom, Arendt saw the inversion of politics, an eradication of every sign of humanity. In her book, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951),⁴ Arendt argued that the main goal of totalitarianism was total domination; namely, the virtual eradication of human plurality, legality, morality, individuality, and the capacity for spontaneity. The totalitarian experiment in total domination, according to Arendt, “can be realized almost to perfection” only in the concentration camps, which served as the major “laboratories” for the regime.⁵ Inflicting permanent terror on the prisoners of the camps, the totalitarian regime revealed the essence of its purpose: changing human nature, i.e., transforming the individual “into a completely conditioned being.”⁶
Introduction

It is my contention that through a historical and philosophical analysis of totalitarianism, Arendt developed not only her theories of action and “the political” but also her notion of the human condition. Throughout her lifelong attempt to comprehend the unprecedented effort of the totalitarian regime to dehumanize humans, Arendt strove to explain the logic behind the totalitarian machine, but at the same time she taught us about human nature. In the course of examining what total domination does, what dehumanization kills, Arendt defined what is human. In OT, her answer to the question, “What is a human being?” consists of three levels: legal rights, morality, and individuality.

This book’s central purpose is to interrogate the “experiment in total domination” through the points of view of those who were actually subjected to it. Drawing on various testimonies of Holocaust survivors, I seek to trace the limits of the Nazis’ attempt to reach total domination over humans. I apply the categories of Arendt’s analysis of total domination (i.e., legality, morality, and individuality) as a theoretical lens through which to question, examine, and synthesize the testimonies themselves in order to understand what it means to be human. This study turns Arendt’s thought about total domination and the camps around on its axis: while Arendt’s focus was on analyzing the goals of the totalitarian regime; i.e., the perspectives and motivations of the perpetrators, my investigation focuses on the opposite perspective, one that Arendt tended to downplay, that of the victims. Consciously deemphasizing the Nazi standpoint and looking at the same process of dehumanization through the experience and point of view of the victims, I seek to gain a better understanding of what a human being is and what life in extremity means. The abundance of sources available to us today, which were not accessible to Arendt when she wrote OT, allows us to refine one of the core elements in her understanding of totalitarianism.

Arendt’s hypothesis regarding the drive of the totalitarian regime—at least in its Nazi variant, with which this study is concerned—serves as my starting point. As we shall see, “total domination” serves as an analytical model, or an “ideal type,” and as such, it can never be found in its pure form in reality. Nevertheless, I argue that we can gain a better understanding of this theoretical construction through the experiences of the victims. In this book, I conduct a dialogue between Arendt’s theory of total domination—one that is rooted, among other things, in her own empirical research—and these human experiences, as reflected in the testimonies of survivors.

In OT, Arendt describes the three steps to the establishment of total domination: the first involves destroying the juridical person; the second is the murder of the moral person in the human being; and the third is annihilating individuality. While I find the success of the first stage of the process as evident, the second and third invite further illumination. Hence, the two main questions to be analyzed in the testimonies are whether, and how, prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps were able to retain their moral being and their individuality.
In my work I study a spectrum of Holocaust survivors’ testimonies, written and oral, from contemporary diaries, through early testimonies written immediately following the end of the war, to those written more recently. The book provides a detailed engagement with both well-known and non-canonical intellectuals and writers who survived the Auschwitz and Buchenwald concentration camps, including Primo Levi, Jean Améry, Charlotte Delbo, Jorge Semprun, Imre Kertész, and Viktor Frankl. In addition, it analyzes the oral testimonies of survivors who are largely unknown and who provide more “raw” descriptions of their experiences. These accounts are drawn from interviews conducted in Israel and in the US, as well as from videotaped interviews in the archives of the University of Southern California Shoah Foundation, the Institute for Visual History and Education; the archives of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM); the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University, and the archives at Yad Vashem (the Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority).

Facing the methodological and historiographical challenges of writing about a subject as complex as life in a concentration and extermination camp based in large part on eyewitness accounts, I follow contemporary trends in Holocaust historiography; for example, the recent works of Saul Friedländer and Christopher Browning. Taking into account the inherent limitations involved in survivors’ testimonies (especially those recorded many years after the events in question occurred), such as inaccuracy, subjectivity, and tendentiousness, I wish to emphasize my contention that such testimonies are an invaluable source that enable the researcher to gain a better understanding of life in the camps. At the same time, I do not wish to argue that survivors have exclusive authority when interpreting the operation of the camps. In addition to survivors’ testimonies, I also draw on analyses by political theorists, historians, sociologists, and psychoanalysts. None of these voices, I maintain, has primacy over any other; they are rather, or at least should be, complementary and dialogic.

My aim is neither to construct a value theory nor to reach a final conclusion regarding human nature but to pursue and demonstrate an ethic of careful listening and reading. Behind the notion of an “ethics of listening” is the assumption that giving voice to trauma, suffering, and loss—listening attentively to what is said and what is unsaid in the survivors’ testimonies—can teach us about the human condition and the meaning of life under extreme circumstances. My analysis develops from two central arguments: 1. In order to comprehend the human experience in general and in Auschwitz in particular, we need to examine a plurality of experiences and perspectives, a contention which accords with Arendt’s own philosophy. 2. When dealing with such extraordinary stories, one should attempt to approach them without a priori judgments regarding what is moral or immoral behavior.
stance, we can gain a fuller and perhaps more accurate picture of human beings in their plurality. We may also be able to glimpse the complexity and individuality of the process of dehumanization, which was experienced differently by each person in the camps.

Hence, there is no “one story” or “one experience” of Auschwitz. Not only did the prisoners who were deported to the concentration camps from all over Europe come from different national, social, religious, and ideological backgrounds, each and every one of them had his or her own biography that shaped the way in which they acted and coped with the new life conditions that were forced upon them. Parameters such as gender, age, health, and psychological and physical strength all had an impact on the prisoners’ conduct and their chances of survival. As Arendt accurately expressed it in *The Human Condition* (1958), “Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live.”

The book’s main emphasis is on testimonies of Jewish survivors of Auschwitz and Buchenwald for three main reasons: 1. the importance of these camps; 2. their relevance to Arendt’s theory; and 3. the extent of existing knowledge. Accounts of survivors of Buchenwald were the main source from which Arendt drew her first impressions of life in the concentration camps. Buchenwald, a camp established on German soil before the war, originally designed to suppress political enemies of the Reich, has come to represent the SS concentration camp system as a whole. Auschwitz, on the other hand, has become virtually synonymous with the Holocaust itself and with the notion of “radical evil.” The Auschwitz concentration camp complex was the largest and most lethal of all the camps established by the Nazis. One and a half million people—men, women and children—were deported to Auschwitz. According to the most recent estimations, at least 1.1 million people were murdered in Auschwitz. Of this number, close to one million victims were Jews (90 percent).

Of these two camps, this study focuses on Auschwitz, primarily due to its uniqueness within the general concentration camp system—as simultaneously a killing center, a concentration camp, and a series of more than forty slave-labor camps. As a result of this distinctive structure, the majority of survivors from extermination camps are from Auschwitz-Birkenau. Consequently, an extensive body of testimony of survivors from this camp is available today and is by far larger than testimonies available from any other extermination camp. This work deals almost exclusively with testimonies of Jewish survivors for several reasons: first, I follow Arendt’s theoretical framework, which identifies the Jews as the paradigmatic case of “statelessness and rightlessness.” Second, with the execution of the so-called “Final Solution of the Jewish Question,” European Jewry became the main target of a systematic annihilation based on racial categorizations. Finally, the incarceration conditions of Jewish inmates in Auschwitz, in comparison to prisoners of other origins, were the worst. Hence, the Nazi extermination
project, in which Auschwitz played a major role, created unprecedented conditions through which we can examine the experiment in “total domination” and the limits of the human.

In order to answer questions concerning the conditions of morality and individuality in the camps, a close examination of typical situations in the concentration camps is crucial. I aim to present what Clifford Geertz has called a “thick description” of L’univers concentrationnaire. In methodological terms, thick descriptions are analyses of meaning, i.e., they present a reading of the meaning of what has happened. A central theme in this interrogation is resistance and its various manifestations in the camps. I employ a wide definition of resistance, best captured in the Hebrew concept of amidah (steadfastness) and understood as all expressions of Jewish non-conformism and all acts aimed at thwarting the Nazis’ goal: depriving Jews of their humanity before physically exterminating them. I examine testimonies of ordinary prisoners, as well as those who were defined by Primo Levi as constituting the “gray zone” in the camps, such as Kapos (heads of work commandos), other prisoner-functionaries, and inmates who belonged to the Sonderkommando. Through an analysis of different cases, including that of the Muselmann (camp jargon for “the walking dead”)—who “touched the bottom,” as Levi puts it, and reached a most radical form of dehumanization—I present a complex picture of life under extreme conditions. This picture reveals various patterns of moral decision-making that can perhaps teach us more about ourselves or at least move us to reflect on our own condition in more subtle ways.

This study’s primary goal is not to reach a conclusive answer as to whether and to what extent total domination was realized; such a sweeping conclusion demands that we deal with too many hypotheticals; indeed, such a conclusion may be unreachable. Rather, it seeks to examine places and situations in which it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to answer this question—where outside-of-the-camp moral codes had to be fundamentally transformed and where the Arendtian category of free action can scarcely be found—and to emphasize the plurality of different experiences of camp life. What the study shows is that although the camp was the site of a radical experiment in changing human nature, the most extreme conditions theorized by Arendt’s ideal type of “total domination” were often undermined by the sheer fact of human plurality. As long as people were alive, creativity appeared; spontaneity existed, even in the concentration camps.

Although I follow Arendt’s theoretical outline in my analysis of testimonies and accept her understanding of the logic of the totalitarian regime as a working hypothesis, I find her account lacking in terms of the space or the respect she was willing to grant the human experience in the camps. Though Arendt’s analysis relied heavily on survivors’ testimonies, her attitude toward them was skeptical and ambivalent. She was not interested in their subjective experiences. In fact, Arendt dismissed the significance and relevance of testimonies and eyewitness accounts for the understanding
of the phenomenon of the concentration camps. In OT, she argued that
the survivors of the concentration camps were not capable of reflecting on
their experience in any meaningful way. Arendt held that in dealing with an
“unimaginable” phenomenon such as Auschwitz, the point of view of the
survivors, who cannot distance themselves from their experience, could not
be relied upon to build an accurate analysis of the event. The recollection
and the “uncommunicative eyewitness report” of the survivor, Arendt argued,
cannot capture the whole picture as can the reflective thought of people who
“have not actually been smitten in their own flesh.” Only “those who are
consequently free from the bestial, desperate terror . . . can afford to keep
thinking about horrors.”22 One of the main purposes and motivations of
this book is to show that survivors’ testimonies are much more relevant,
precisely in thinking about horrors and resisting their thoughtlessness, than
Arendt was willing to admit.

Although a number of important scholarly studies have analyzed Arendt’s
theory of totalitarianism, this is the first book-length study to juxtapose
Arendt’s concept of total domination with the actual testimonies of Holo-
caust survivors. By doing so, this book also addresses important methodo-
logical questions pertaining to the epistemic validity of testimonies in the
writing of political history. These questions radicalize Arendt’s methodology
and theoretical commitment to pluralism. This study both confronts
Arendt’s political theory of totalitarianism and calls for methodological
pluralism and the integration of the voices and narratives of the actors in
the construction of political concepts and theoretical systems. This move, I
believe, might in some ways be more compatible with Arendt’s own pluralis-
tic premises than her own analysis sometimes is. The latter, for reasons that
will be dealt with in this work, retreats from a fully pluralistic account of
total domination by undervaluing the survivors’ perspectives.

The “story of the Nazi-constructed hell,” to use Arendt’s words, is thus
told in my work in many voices. The structure of this study can be described
as comprising different layers, sources, and voices of “storytelling”—chiefly
by survivors but also by scholars of different disciplines. In the first chapter,
I introduce Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism in general and her reflections
on total domination in particular. The chapter analyzes the stages in the
process of achieving total domination and reveals some major ambiguities
concerning the question of whether Arendt believed that it had actually been
realized. The chapter deals, among other themes, with the following ques-
tions: Did Arendt believe that she was writing about a historical reality
or was she, rather, presenting a model or ideal type? If it is true that total
domination can be realized, did the Nazi totalitarian regime achieve it? And
lastly, if it was achieved, did it exist only in the Nazi concentration camps or
was it to be found elsewhere under the Nazi regime?

Chapter 2 traces the historical sources upon which Arendt based her
reflections on total domination and examines the role of both concentration
and extermination camps in her theory. Though the camps hold a prominent
role in her reflections on total domination, Arendt rarely makes a clear-cut distinction between the two types of camps. In most cases, she refers to concentration camps. I offer several possible explanations for this, including the influence of the political discourse that prevailed after the war in Europe (and especially in France), where the distinction between extermination and concentration camps did not exist or, rather, was vague. The chapter demonstrates that although Arendt’s blurred usage of the two types of camps indeed derived from the sources available to her, it ultimately exceeded contemporary political discourse and reveals her inner theoretical logic.

Chapter 3 lays down the methodological foundation for the study, exploring the themes of witnessing, testimony, and memory. A discussion of the value and limitations of testimonies is intertwined with a historical-political analysis of the evolution of testimony and its reception by society. The chapter reveals that the reluctance of society to accept Holocaust survivors’ testimonies and the establishment of the survivor as a social figure went hand-in-hand with the willingness and ability of the survivors to share their horrific experiences with others—a process that took several decades in the US, Europe, and Israel. Thus, although much was already known about the concentration camps in the late 1940s, it cannot be compared with the abundance of testimonies available today.

Chapters 4 through 6 examine new knowledge and empirical data that may help us to reevaluate the idea of total domination in light of the vast scholarly work on the concentration camps and the extensive literature by Holocaust survivors published since the late 1940s. Chapter 4 analyzes the process of dehumanization to which prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps were subjected. It attempts to answer two primary questions: How did the prisoners experience their loss of humanity, and what did “dignity” (and its loss) mean for the survivors? I divide this process into three analytical categories that correspond to three chronological stages: 1) The first stage: Exclusion—the years of persecution until deportation; 2) The second stage: Loss of control—deportation, the journey in cattle cars to the camps, and the processing procedure; and 3) The third stage: Nakedness and deprivation—life as a prisoner in the camp. The epitome of this stage is the phenomenon of the Muselmann.

Chapter 5 examines the possibilities for resistance in the extreme and dehumanizing conditions of the camps. It asks in what ways and to what extent did the prisoners in Auschwitz manage to resist. Following the theoretical framework set forth by Tzvetan Todorov, the chapter focuses primarily on unarmed resistance, which is organized around three main themes: preserving one’s dignity; mutual aid among prisoners; and the “life of the mind,” which includes intellectual, cultural, aesthetic, and religious/spiritual activities or experiences in the camps. The chapter analyzes different moral conducts and various examples of mutual aid and solidarity among the prisoners; in particular, among those of the same nationality who shared the same language.
Chapter 6 presents a special case, that of the Sonderkommando at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Scrutinizing an extreme situation in Auschwitz of prisoners who were forced to eyewitness and participate in the killing apparatus of their own people, this chapter reveals the complexities and contradictions in the efforts of these inmates to maintain their humanity and morality under the worst of circumstances. Some examples of their efforts to resist dehumanization include the strong sense of solidarity among the Sonderkommando prisoners, mutual help, the existence of religious practices and cultural life, risking one’s life by secretly writing diaries, and the armed uprising of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando, the only uprising in the history of that camp.

Chapter 7 reintroduces Arendt’s thought: the first section compares her reflections on total domination with my findings from the testimonies of survivors. The second section examines Arendt’s attitude toward survivors’ testimonies and suggests that her tendency to downplay the human experience of the survivors may be related to some of her broader theoretical concerns regarding political judgment and political mores that focus on suffering, compassion, and pity.

The concluding chapter sharpens the differences between Arendt’s approach and the one followed and presented in this study, reinforcing my contention that listening attentively to testimonies of Holocaust survivors can bring us closer to an understanding of the human condition. The chapter picks up on Arendt’s emphasis on plurality in works other than OT and underscores its importance in analyzing camp life.

NOTES

2. This article was published in Commentary II/3 (1946) as a book review by Arendt on The Black Book: The Nazi Crime Against the Jewish People and Max Weinreich’s Hitler’s Professors.
3. Arendt was born in October 1906 in Hannover, Germany, the only child of Martha and Paul Arendt, secular Jews. She grew up in Königsberg and Berlin. She died in 1975 in New York.
4. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed. with added prefaces (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979). All quotes hereafter are from this edition, unless otherwise specified. The Origins of Totalitarianism was Arendt’s first book written and published in English. Her dissertation on the concept of love in St. Augustine appeared as a book in German in 1929. Her second book, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, which was written in German in the early 1930s, before OT, was first published only in 1958.


9. A term most associated with Max Weber, the “ideal type” is an abstract model that, when used as a standard of comparison, can guide us to construct hypotheses about reality and see the world in a clearer, more systematic way. The ideal typical concept is not a description of reality but rather an abstract “idea” of the historically given phenomenon, based on its characteristic features of it. “In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality,” writes Weber. An ideal type is not an ethical ideal (Endpunkt) of what ought to be, but only an investigational or instrumental (heuristic) ideal that the scientist may use for research and comparison with her actual findings. Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, ed. Edward Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949), 90.


15. Buchenwald, with its more than 130 satellite camps located across Germany, was one of the largest concentration camps established by the Nazis. It was constructed in 1937 in a wooded area on the northern slopes of the Ettersberg, eight kilometers (five miles) northwest of the city of Weimar in Thuringia. Between July 1937 and April 1945, some 238,980 persons from all countries of Europe were imprisoned in Buchenwald. Exact mortality figures for the Buchenwald site can only be estimated, as a considerable number of prisoners
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were never registered: at least 56,000 male prisoners were murdered in the Buchenwald camp system. Jews were the largest group of dead in the camp, about 30 percent. Evelyn Zegenhagen, “Buchenwald Main Camp,” trans. Stephen Pallavicini, in Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933–1945, vol. I: Early Camps, Concentration Camps and Subcamps under the SS-Business Administration Main Office (WVHA), and Youth Camps, ed. Geoffree P. Megargee, foreword by Elie Wiesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2009), 290–93.

16. These estimations are the fruit of 25 years of historical research by the Polish scholar Franciszek Piper. His book, which was published only in 1992, forty-seven years after the liberation of Auschwitz, refutes the exaggerated estimate of four million victims, a figure that, until then, was repeatedly given by the Auschwitz Museum. Other victim groups include: 70,000–75,000 Poles; about 21,000 Roma (Gypsies); about 15,000 Soviet prisoners-of-war (POWs); and 10,000–15,000 people of other nationalities. Michael Berenbaum, “Preface,” in Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp, ed. Yisrael Gutman and Michael Berenbaum (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C., 1994), viii, 2; Franciszek Piper, “The Number of Victims,” in Gutman and Berenbaum, Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp, 62, 68–72. See also Raul Hilberg, “Auschwitz,” in the Holocaust Encyclopedia, ed. Walter Laqueur (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 44.

17. Auschwitz was located near the small Polish district town of Oświęcim, 50 kilometers (37 miles) southwest of Krakow and 286 kilometers (178 miles) from Warsaw. The two largest camps in the Auschwitz complex were Auschwitz I (the Stammlager, or base camp) and Auschwitz II (Auschwitz-Birkenau), hereafter referred to as Auschwitz-Birkenau or Birkenau (Polish: Brzezinka). Auschwitz I was established in April 1940 as a concentration camp for Polish political prisoners but from September 1940 until July 1943 operated a gas chamber and crematorium. Birkenau was an extension camp established in October 1941 about three kilometers from the original camp. Approximately five times the size of Auschwitz I, it was originally intended for Soviet POWs. From the spring of 1942, Birkenau primarily turned into the killing center of European Jewry, housing the principal gas chambers and four crematoria. Auschwitz III-Monowitz, also known as Buna, was the largest satellite camp of the Auschwitz complex. It was located six and half kilometers (4 miles) east of Auschwitz I, near the Polish town of Monowice. It was established in October 1942 to house prisoners assigned to work at the Buna synthetic rubber plant (Buna Werke), a factory established in the spring of 1941 by the German chemical firm IG Farben. Yisrael Gutman, “Auschwitz—An Overview,” in Gutman and Berenbaum, Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp, 6–7, 16–19; Florian Schmaltz, “Auschwitz III-Monowitz Main Camp [Aka Buna],” in Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933–1945, I: 215–18.

18. Of 405,000 prisoners who were registered in Auschwitz, about 65,000 (both Jews and non-Jews) survived. For the sake of comparison, in the rest of the extermination camps—Belzec, Chelmno, Treblinka, and Majdanek—only a few hundred survived. Shmuel Krakowski and Jozef Buszko, “Auschwitz,” in Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, Israel Gutman, editor in chief (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 1: 117.


20. Here I follow Marc Dwoezecki’s definition of amidah. See Marc Dwoezecki, “The Day to Day Stand of the Jews,” in The Catastrophe of European Jewry: